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Abstract
In this paper we study the generalized version of weighted matching in bipartite networks. Consider a
weighted matching in a bipartite network in which the nodes derive value from the split of the matching
edge assigned to them if they are matched. The value a node derives from the split depends both on
the split as well as the partner the node is matched to. We assume that the value of a split to the node
is continuous and strictly increasing in the part of the split assigned to the node. A stable weighted
matching is a matching and splits on the edges in the matching such that no two adjacent nodes in the
network can split the edge between them so that both of them can derive a higher value than in the
matching. We extend the weighted matching problem to this general case and study the existence of a
stable weighted matching. We also present an algorithm that converges to a stable weighted matching.
The algorithm generalizes the Hungarian algorithm for bipartite matching. Faster algorithms can be
made when there is more structure on the value functions.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the following problem. Consider a weighted matching in a bipartite
network in which the nodes derive value from the split of the matching edge assigned to
them if they are matched. The value a node derives from the split depends both on the split
as well as the partner the node is matched to. We assume that the value of a split to the
node is continuous and strictly increasing in the part of the split assigned to the node. A
stable weighted matching is a matching and splits on the edges in the matching such that
no two adjacent nodes in the network can split the edge between them so that both of them
can derive a higher value than in the matching. We extend the weighted matching problem
to this general case and study the existence of a stable weighted matching. We also present
an algorithm that converges to a stable weighted matching. The algorithm generalizes the
Hungarian algorithm [8] for bipartite matching. Faster algorithms can be made when there
is more structure on the value functions.
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Weighted matching in bipartite networks has been studied in the context of linear valua-
tions [10]. The problem is often posed as such.
In a bipartite network S = (A ∪B,E ⊆ A× B), whose nodes belong to A∪B and whose
edges connect nodes from A to nodes in B with weights w (i, j) for the edge (i, j) that can be
split between i and j as si and sj to give them values Vi = si and Vj = sj, find a matchingM
∗
with characteristic function χM that maximizes the sum of weights of edges in the matching
∑
(i,j)∈E
w (i, j)χ (i, j)
The characteristic function χM must satisfy the following constraints to be the characteristic
function of a matching.
∑
(i,j)∈E
χ (i, j) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ A ∪ B (1)
χ (i, j) ≥ 0, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E (2)
χ (i, j) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E (3)
The last constraint is an integer constraint and can be neglected since the corners of the
polytope resulting from the remaining constraints are integral. The above is called the
maximum weight matching problem. In a finite graph with finite weights, the optimal
solution exists and the optimal value is finite. The stable matching problem is the dual of
the maximum weight matching problem which is to find the minimum sum of values given
to the nodes in the network
min
∑
i∈A∪B
Vi (4)
such that Vi + Vj ≥ w (i, j) , ∀ (i, j) ∈ E (5)
Vi ≥ 0 (6)
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The existence of a stable matching is evident from the finiteness of the optimal value in the
maximum weight matching problem. In fact at optimal solution for the stable matching
problem, for any edge (i, j) ∈M∗, Vi + Vj = w (i, j). For any maximum weighted matching,
there exists splits s = V that is an optimal solution to the stable matching problem. This
problem has been well understood and several algorithms have been proposed to find the
optimal stable matching. The extensions, when the values V are increasing functions of the
split and do not depend upon the edge, can be reduced to the above problem.
We study the problem when the values V depend upon the edge as well as the part of
the split given to the node. The stable matching problem in this case is as such. Find a
matching M◦ and a split s such that
si + sj = w (i, j) , ∀ (i, j) ∈M
◦ (7)
vi = Vi (j, si) , vj = Vj (i, sj) , ∀ (i, j) ∈M
◦ (8)
V −1i (j, vi) + V
−1
j (i, vj) ≥ w (i, j) , ∀ (i, j) ∈ E (9)
si ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ A ∪B (10)
The existence of such a matching and a split is not evident. In this paper, we show that
such a matching and a split exists and we give an algorithm to find such a matching and a
split. The problem features in many practical problems. We give a few examples.
Consider the stable marriage problem and related problems studied in [4] and later by
several others. A survey of related literature can be found in [9]. The classical formulation
assumes exogeneous partner preferences. Other formulations including [1] study endoge-
neous partner preferences arising from types of partners. An important and more realistic
formulation is to consider that utilities of individuals in a marriage depends both on the
type or the identity of the partner as well as the effort the partner puts in the marriage. In
this scenario, a stable marriage is the one in which the neither partner in the marriage has
a proposal for mariage in which the partner will have a higher utility.
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Another example is the exchanges in buyer-seller networks [7]. The problem has been
studied in the context of indivisible goods. An important scenario is the case of divisible
goods with the buyer-seller relations being exclusive. When the preferences for the goods are
strictly convex, continuous and strongly monotone, we observe a connected contract curve
or the set of individually rational pareto-efficient exchanges between any adjacent buyer-
seller pair in the network. As we move along the contract curve in a given direction, the
utility of buyer/seller strictly decreases and the utility of seller/buyer strictly increases. The
stable set of exchanges in this network is the one in which all exchanges are stable or no
adjacent buyer-seller pair in the network can do better by simultaneously breaking their
current contracts and forming a new contract among them.
An important example is the study of bargaining in networks. This problem has recently
been studied widely and takes the form of the stable matching problem in teh case of lin-
ear utilities. However, often in real life bargaining situations, the utility is non-trasferable
between the bargaining parties through a quasilinear numeraire. In such situations as the
sum of offers to the two parties in bargaining is not constant. A stable bargaining solution
in this case takes a different form as studied in this paper. Another line of work that can
benefit by the results in this paper is the work on social games introduced in [5].
The organization of the rest of the paper is as such. In the next section, we introduce the
setup. We try to maintain the notations close to the notations in the matching literature
while introduce additional terminology as required. In section 3, we show introduce some
important concepts that are needed to prove the existence of a stable matching. Finally in
section 4, we show a contructive proof and an algorithm to find the stable matching.
2 Setup
In this section we formulate the problem and introduce necessary terminology.
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2.1 Network and Payoffs
Assume A and B are two finite and mutually exclusive sets of nodes and X = A ∪ B. A
bipartite network between A and B is a graph S = (X,E ⊆ A× B), whose nodes belong to
X and whose edges connect nodes from A to nodes in B. Given a bipartite network S, we
will refer to the set of nodes as XS, the sets of nodes in A and B as AS and BS respectively,
and the set of edges as ES when necessary. When the node set X is understood, we will
refer to the network by the edge set E. Without loss of generality, we will assume that the
graph S is connected.
A set of nodes X ′ ⊆ X induces a subgraph S|X′ =
(
X ′, E|X′
)
of S, such that E|X′ =
{(i, j) ∈ E : i ∈ X ′, j ∈ X ′}.
The set of neighbors of a node i ∈ A is NbrS (i) = {j ∈ B : (i, j) ∈ E}. The set of
neighbors of a node of j ∈ B is NbrS (j) = {i ∈ A : (i, j) ∈ E}. When the context is well
understood, we will also refer to NbrS (i) as NbrE (i) or just Nbr (i). The set of neighboring
nodes of x ⊆ X is NbrS (x) = ∪i∈xNbr
S (i).
A weight function w : E → R+ assigns a weight to each edge. An edge (i, j) with i ∈ A
and j ∈ B has a weight w (i, j) that can be split between i and j.
A split s(i,j) on the edge (i, j) is the pair (si, sj), with si + sj = w (i, j).
The nodes derive payoffs from the part of the split given to them. For a split s(i,j), the
payoff of the node i is ui (j, si) and the payoff of the node j is uj (i, sj). The payoff of a
node depends upon both the part of the split given to the node and the edge on which the
split is made. Thus for each edge the payoff of a node is a unique function of the part of the
split given to the person. We assume that these payoff functions are strictly increasing and
continuous and hence they are invertible and the inverse functions are also strictly increasing
and continuous.
We also define payoffs of nodes as a function of its neighbor when the split is made
between them. The payoff of node j for the split on edge (i, j) is a function of the payoff of
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node i is vj (i, vi) = uj
(
i, w (i, j)− u−1i (j, vi)
)
. So the payoffs of neighboring nodes for the
split between them are strictly decreasing and continuous with respect to one another. For
simplicity, we will assume that the function vi (j, x) is defined for all x ∈ R and is strictly
decreasing and continuous. We will refer to these functions as pareto payoff function.
2.2 Matching
A matching in the bipartite network is a subset of edges M ⊆ E such that no two edges
in M share a common node. The size of the matching |M | is the number of edges in the
matching. The matching defines a characteristic function on the set of edges in the bipartite
network χM : E → {0, 1} where ∀ (i, j) ∈ E,
χM (i, j) =


1 if (i, j) ∈M
0 if (i, j) /∈M
such that
∀i ∈ A,
∑
j∈Nbr(i) χ
M (i, j) ≤ 1 and
∀j ∈ B,
∑
i∈Nbr(j) χ
M (i, j) ≤ 1.
The match for a node i ∈ A in the matching M is
M (i) =


j ∈ Nbr (i) ifχM (i, j) = 1
null if
∑
j∈Nbr(i) χ
M (i, j) = 0
.
We say that a node i is matched if M (i) 6= null.
A split for a matching M is a function sM : A ∪ B → R+ such that
∀ (i, j) ∈ M, sM (i) + sM (j) = w (i, j)
∀i ∈ A, sM (i) = 0if
∑
j∈Nbr(i) χ
M (i, j) = 0
∀j ∈ B, sM (j) = 0if
∑
i∈Nbr(j) χ
M (i, j) = 0.
A weighted matching
(
M, sM
)
is a pair matching and a split for the matching.
The payoff profile U
(
M, sM
)
for a weighted matching
(
M, sM
)
is a vector where each
element is the payoff of a node for the given weighted matching. The payoff of a node i for
the weighted matching
(
M, sM
)
is
6
Ui
(
M, sM
)
= ui
(
M (i) , sM (i)
)
.
A weighted matching is stable if ∀ (i, j) ∈ E and all splits s(i,j) on (i, j),
ui (j, si) ≤ Ui
(
M, sM
)
and uj (i, sj) ≤ Uj
(
M, sM
)
.
2.3 Paths
A path in the network S is a subgraph P =
(
XP , EP
)
, where XP ⊆ A∪B is a set of nodes
and EP is a set of edges with both end points in XP such that two nodes in XP have exactly
one edge in EP and all other nodes in XP have exactly two edges in EP . The two nodes with
exactly one edge will be referred to as the end nodes. A path also induces index function
over its nodes as follows:
1. Pick an end node and set its index as 0. This node is the source node.
2. Set i← last indexed node.
3. If i is an end node, then stop else index the only unindexed neighbor of i as (index of
i)+1. The end node with the highest index is the sink node.
This index generates a sequence of nodes {xPn } where the subscript stands for the index and
xP0 and x
P
|X| are end nodes.
Thus a path P of length N can be seen as a sequence {xn}n∈{0,...,N} of nodes in A ∪ B,
such that ∀n < N, (xn, xn+1) ∈ E. We call this a path from the source to the sink node.
Alternatively, a path is a sequence of nodes such that for each node in the sequence shares
edges with both the immediately preceding and immediately succeeding nodes. When the
source and sink is determined for the path P , we will refer a path from the source i to sink
j as Pi,j. The reverse path from j to i will be refered to as Pj,i.
A subpath P ′ of a path P is a connected subgraph of the path P . Alternatively, a
subpath P ′ ⊆ P between nodes xm, xM ∈ X
P is a subsequence {xPn }n∈{m,...,M}. A subpath
is a path by itself.
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The union of two paths P1 and P2 is also a path P3 = P1 ∪ P2 if P1 and P2 share exactly
one end node.
We will denote the set of paths from i to j in a network S as PSi,j.
2.4 Offers
An offer profile is a vector O ∈ RA∪B where the element Oi is node i’s offer. We will
denote the restriction of an offer profile O to a set of nodes X as O|X .
An offer profileO is feasible, if ∃
(
M, sM
)
weighted matching, with payoff profileU
(
M, sM
)
=
O.
An offer profile O is stable if ∀(i, j) ∈ E, Oj ≥ vj (i, Oi).
Using the definition and properties of the pareto payoff functions, we can reformulate the
stable matching problem as such. Find a matching M◦ and a split s such that
si + sj = w (i, j) , ∀ (i, j) ∈M
◦ (11)
oi = ui (j, si) , oj = uj (i, sj) , ∀ (i, j) ∈M
◦ (12)
oj ≥ vj (i, oi)}, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E (13)
si ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ A ∪B (14)
The first, second and fourth inequalities provide the constraints for the offer profile to
be feasible and the third inequality provide the constraints for the offer profile to be stable.
Thus, if we have a feasible and stable offer profile, then we have a weighted stable matching.
Hence, in this paper, we will focus on finding a feasible and stable offer profile.
Given an offer profile O, the equality subgraph EQ (O) is the subset of edges E with
EQ (O) = {(i, j) ∈ E : Oj = vj (i, Oi)}.
We will refer to the neighbors of a node i in the equality subgraph EQ (O) asNbrEQ(O) (i).
Given an offer profile O, a path P is feasible if EP ⊆ EQ (O).
Given a node i with offer oi ≥ 0, a path P with an end node i induces an offer for each
8
node xPn in the path as follows:
• xP0 = i, Therefore, OxP0 = oi
• ∀0 < n < N,OxPn = vxPn
(
xPn−1, OxPn−1
)
.
For any pair of nodes i, j and a path P from i to j, we define the path induced offer
function fPi,j : R → R where f
P
i,j (x) is the offer that P induces for j given i has the offer
x. Clearly, fPi,j is continuous since the pareto payoff functions are continuous. Also f
P
i,j is
strictly increasing if both i, j ∈ A or both i, j ∈ B and strictly decreasing if either i ∈ A and
j ∈ B or i ∈ B and j ∈ A since pareto payoff functions are strictly decreasing.
Given a node i with offer x and another node i′, a path P ∗i,i′ from i to i
′ is maximum
offer inducing path from i to i′ given the offer x on i if
P ∗i,i′ ∈ arg max
P∈PS
i,i′
fPi,i′ (x).
The maximum offer inducing paths and the maximum path induced offers have important
properties that we will use for the main result. In the following two lemmas we state these
properties.
Lemma 1. Assume i, i′ ∈ A and x ∈ R. Assume P ∗i,i′ is a maximum offer inducing path
from i to i′ given the offer x on i. If P ′i,i′′ ⊆ P
∗
i,i′ is the subpath between nodes i and i
′′ ∈ A
P ∗
i,i′ .
Then P ′i,i′′ is a maximum offer inducing path from i to i
′′ given the offer x on i.
Proof. The proof follows from the principle of optimality [2] and is omitted.
Lemma 2. Pick i ∈ A and oi ∈ R.
For all i′ ∈ A set
Oi′ = max
P∈PS
i,i′
fPi,i′ (oi).
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For all j ∈ B, set
Oj = max
i′∈Nbr(j)
vj (i
′, Oi′).
Then the following hold true about the equality subgraph EQ (O)
1. the equality subgraph EQ (O) is connected and the offer profile O is stable. Therefore
all nodes j ∈ B have at least one edge in the equality subgraph.
2. ∀ (i′, j) ∈ E, either (i′, j) ∈ EQ (O) or all paths from i to i′ in EQ (O) include at least
one of the nodes i′′ ∈ NbrEQ(O) (j).
3. If (i′, j′) , (i′, j′′) ∈ E \EQ (O) and vi′ (j
′, Oj′) > vi′ (j
′′, Oj′′), then all paths from i to j
′
in EQ (O) include at least one node in NbrEQ(O) (j′′).
4. If (i′, j′) ∈ E \EQ (O), then for any path Pi,i′ ∈ P
S
i,i′ that does not include at least one
node in NbrEQ(O) (j′), f
Pi,i′
i,i′ ≤ vi′ (j
′, Oj′).
Proof. Consider all nodes in A for which the maximum offer inducing path is of length 2.
Pick any of such nodes i′ and its neighbor j along the maximum offer inducing path. Clearly
Oj ≥ vj (i
′, Oi′) from the construction of Oj. Assume Oj > vj (i
′, Oi′). Then ∃ (i
′′, j) ∈ E
with Oi′′ = vi′′ (j, Oj) < vi′′ (j, vj (i
′, Oi′)), the inequality exists because the functions v are
strictly increasing. This implies that Oi′′ is not the maximum path induced offer induced on
i′′ over all paths from i to i′′. Therefore by contradiction Oj = vj (i
′, Oi′) and i
′ is connected
to i in EQ (O) through a maximum offer inducing path.
Now assume that all nodes in A for which the maximum offer inducing path is of length
less than n is connected to i through a maximum offer inducing path. Then following lemma
1 for all nodes in A for which the maximum offer inducing path is of length n all nodes in A
along the path are connected to i along the same path. Also by a similar argument as above
all nodes in A for which the maximum offer inducing path is of length n is connected to i
through a maximum offer inducing path. Thus by induction, all nodes in A are connected
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to i through a maximum offer inducing path. As a consequence all nodes in B that belong
to any of the maximum offer inducing paths are also connected to i through the respective
maximum offer inducing paths.
Now since all nodes in B that do not belong to any maximum offer inducing paths are
connected to at least one node in A, therefore they are also connected to i through some
path. Hence the equality subgraph is connected. The offer profile is stable because for all
j ∈ B, Oj = maxi′∈Nbr(j) vj (i
′, Oi′).
We now prove the second claim. Assume that there exists (i′, j) ∈ E \ EQ (O) and path
Pi,i′ from i to i
′ in EQ (O) that does not include any of the nodes in NbrEQ(O) (j). Then
pick a node i′′ ∈ NbrEQ(O) (j) and consider the path Pi,i′ ∪ {i
′, j, i′′}. This path induces
offers vj (i
′, Oi′) < Oj on j and vi′′ (j, vj (i
′, Oi′)) > vi′′ (j, Oj) = Oi′′ . This is a contradiction
because by construction of O, Oi′′ was the maximum offer induced on i
′′ over all paths from
i to i′′ given the offer x on i. Hence the claims holds true.
We now prove the third claim. Assume there exists (i′, j′) , (i′, j′′) ∈ E \ EQ (O) and
vi′ (j
′, Oj′) > vi′ (j
′′, Oj′′). From the second claim, all paths from i to i
′ in EQ (O) include
a node from NbrEQ(O) (j′) and a node from NbrEQ(O) (j′′). First we will show that either
all paths from i to j′ in EQ (O) include at least one node in NbrEQ(O) (j′′) or all paths
from i to j′′ in EQ (O) include at least one node in NbrEQ(O) (j′). Then we will show that
it is actually the first case. Assume there exists a path Pi,j′ from i to j
′ in EQ (O) not
including any node in NbrEQ(O) (j′′) and a path Pi,j′′ from i to j
′′ in EQ (O) not including
any node in NbrEQ(O) (j′). Pick a path Pi,i′. This path includes a node i
′′ with the highest
index among all nodes in NbrEQ(O) (j′) ∪ NbrEQ(O) (j′′) with the highest index. Consider
the subpath Pi′′,i′ ⊂ Pi,i′ . If i
′′ ∈ NbrEQ(O) (j′), then the path Pi,j′ ∪ {j
′, i′′} ∪ Pi′′,i′ is a path
from i to i′ not including any node in NbrEQ(O) (j′′). If i′′ ∈ NbrEQ(O) (j′′), then the path
Pi,j′′ ∪{j
′′, i′′}∪Pi′′,i′ is a path from i to i
′ not including any node in NbrEQ(O) (j′). In either
case, this contradicts the second claim, so either all paths from i to j′ in EQ (O) include
at least one node in NbrEQ(O) (j′′) or all paths from i to j′′ in EQ (O) include at least one
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node in NbrEQ(O) (j′). Now assume that all paths from i to j′′ in EQ (O) include at least
one node in NbrEQ(O) (j′). Pick a path Pi,i′ from i to i
′ in EQ (O) and the node i∗ on the
path Pi,i′ with the lowest index among all nodes in Nbr
EQ(O) (j′)∪NbrEQ(O) (j′′). From the
assumption, i∗ ∈ Nbr
EQ(O) (j′)
Pick a node i′′ ∈ NbrEQ(O) (j′′) and consider the subpaths Pi,i∗ ⊂ Pi,i′ . The path Pi,i∗ ∪
{i∗, j
′, i′}∪{i′, j′′, i′′} exists in S. The path Pi,i∗ ∪{i∗, j
′, i′}∪{i′, j′′, i′′} induces the following
offers:
vi′ (j
′, Oj′) > vi′ (j
′′, Oj′′) on i
′ {from the assumption in the claim}.
vj′′ (i
′, vi′ (j
′, Oj′)) < vj′′ (i
′, vi′ (j
′′, Oj′′)) = Oj′′ on j
′′.
vi′′ (j
′′, vj′′ (i
′, vi′ (j
′, Oj′))) > vi′′
(
j′′, O′′j
)
= Oi′′ on i
′′.
This is a contradiction because by construction of O, Oi′′ was the maximum offer induced on
i′′ over all paths from i to i′′ given the offer x on i. Hence, all paths from i to j′ in EQ (O)
include at least one node in NbrEQ(O) (j′′).
We now prove the the fourth claim. Assume that there exists (i′, j′) ∈ E \ EQ (O) and
path Pi,i′ from i to i
′ in S that does not include any of the nodes in NbrEQ(O) (j′). Then pick a
node i′′ ∈ NbrEQ(O) (j′) and consider the path Pi,i′ ∪ {i
′, j′, i′′}. Assume, f
Pi,i′
i,i′ > vi′ (j
′, Oj′).
Then vj′
(
i′, f
Pi,i′
i,i′
)
< Oj′. The path Pi,i′ ∪ {i
′, j′, i′′} induces offers vj′
(
i′, f
Pi,i′
i,i′
)
< Oj′
on j′′ and vi′′
(
j′, vj′
(
i′, f
Pi,i′
i,i′
))
> vi′′ (j
′, Oj′) = Oi′′ . This is a contradiction because by
construction of O, Oi′′ was the maximum offer induced on i
′′ over all paths from i to i′′ given
the offer x on i. Hence the claims holds true.
2.5 Alternating Paths, Alternating Trees and Near-Perfect Matchings
Given an offer profile O and a matching M ⊆ EQ (O), an alternating path is a path
within the equality subgraph EQ (O) with alternating pair of nodes share an edge in the
matching and not in the matching M .
The matching also induces directionality on the alternating paths in the following way.
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Direct all edges (i, j) ∈M from j to i and all edges (i, j) /∈ M from i to j.
An augmenting path is an alternating path that starts and ends at an unmatched
vertex.
An alternating tree for a matching M is a tree TM which contains exactly one un-
matched node r and has following properties:
• every node at odd distance from r has degree 2 in the tree
• all paths from r are alternating paths
• all leaf nodes are at even distance from r
Clearly, every alternating tree has one more node at even distance from r than at odd
distance from r.
A matching M∗ (O) ⊆ EQ (O) is a maximum matching in the equality subgraph
EQ (O) if |M∗ (O) | = max{|M | : M is a matching in EQ (O)}. A maximum matching
M∗ (O) can be obtained using the augmenting path algorithm [10]. A matching M is a
maximum matching in EQ (O), if and only if there is no augmenting path in EQ (O) with
respect to the matching M [10].
A near-perfect matching M◦ (O) ⊆ EQ (O) is a matching in the equality subgraph
such that exactly one node is unmatched. A near-perfect matching exists only if ‖|A|−|B|‖ =
1.
Given a maximum matching M∗ (O) ⊆ EQ (O), an alternating forest or a Hungarian
forest [3] FM
∗(O) is a collection of alternating trees rooted at nodes in A induced by the
matching. The number of alternating trees in a Hungarian forest is equal to the number of
unmatched nodes in A. The Hungarian forest FM
∗(O) is the subgraph of EQ (O) induced
by the set of nodes X ′ reachable through alternating path from unmatched nodes in A.
Given a maximum matchingM∗ (O) ⊆ EQ (O) and an alternating tree T , an expanding
node is a node i′ ∈ AT with an edge with j′ ∈ B \ BT . We will refer CT to be the set of
expanding nodes for the tree T and for each i′ ∈ CT , the respective expanding offer
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eoi′ = maxj′∈B\BT vi′ (j
′, Oj′). We will also refer to D
T = NbrE
(
CT
)
\ BT as the set of
joining nodes for the tree T .
An alternating tree TM for a matching M is an alternating spanning tree if it spans
all the nodes in the network, i.e.- XT
M
= A ∪B.
An offer profile O is a stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profile
if O is stable and EQ (O) has a near perfect matching M◦ (O) and associated alternating
spanning tree TM
◦(O).
Lemma 3. Consider a set of nodes A and B with |A|− |B| = 1 and a graph S = (A ∪B,E)
that has a near-perfect matching generating an alternating spanning tree. Then:
• Every B′ ⊆ B has least |B′|+ 1 neighboring nodes in A.
• Every A′ ⊂ A has at least |A′| neighboring nodes in B.
Proof. Pick any subset B′ ⊆ B. Since all nodes in B are matched in a near-perfect matching,
then from the Hall’s theorem [6], B′ has edges to at least |B′| nodes in A. Since all nodes
in B′ are interior nodes of an alternating tree, therefore, each node in B′ has one unique
child it is matched to and one parent it is not matched to. Clearly, there is one parent node
different from all the child nodes, or else, there will be a loop in the alternating tree. Hence,
B′ has edges to at least |B′|+ 1 nodes in A in the alternating tree within the network S.
For the second claim, pick any A′ ⊂ A and a near-perfect matchingM with an alternating
tree T . If A′ does not contain the root of the alternating tree, then all nodes in A′ are matched
and hence, the number of neighbors of the set A′ must be at least |A|. If A′ contains the root
of the alternating tree, then pick a node i′ not in A′ and change the matchingM by switching
the edges within the matching with the edges outside the matching along the alternating
path from the root of T to i′. This creates a new near-perfect matching and an alternating
spanning tree whose root is at i′. For this matching, all the nodes in A′ are matched and
hence the claim follows.
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Proposition 1. Consider a set of nodes A and B with |A|−|B| = 1 and an equality subgraph
EQ (O) that is connected. Then EQ (O) has a near-perfect matching if ∃ a tree T ⊆ EQ (O)
with the following properties:
1. ∀j ∈ B, j is not a leaf node in T .
2. ∀j ∈ B, j has exactly one child node in T .
Proof. Clearly ∀B′ ⊆ B, | ∪j∈B′ Nbr(j)| > |B
′|. Hence following Hall’s theorem, there exists
a matchingM◦ in T , such that all of B is matched. Therefore,M◦ is a near-perfect matching.
3 Stable Alternating Spanning Tree Generating Offer Profiles
In this section, we introduce three main lemmas about the existence, uniqueness and strict
monotonicity of the stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profiles. Using this,
we prove the main theorem of this section that helps extend the Hungarian algorithm to
find the generalized stable matching. The main theorem introduces a set of continuous and
strictly monotonic offer generating functions for each pair of nodes in the bipartite network.
Lemma 4. Assume there exists two stable offer profiles O1 and O2.
• If i ∈ A with O1i ≤ O
2
i and (i, j) ∈ EQ (O
2), then O1j ≥ O
2
j .
• If i ∈ A with O1i ≥ O
2
i and (i, j) ∈ EQ (O
1), then O1j ≤ O
2
j .
• If j ∈ B with O1j ≤ O
2
j and (i, j) ∈ EQ (O
2), then O1i ≥ O
2
i .
• If j ∈ B with O1j ≥ O
2
j and (i, j) ∈ EQ (O
1), then O1i ≤ O
2
i .
The resulting inequalities are strict when the conditioning inequalities are strict.
Proof. We only need to prove the first statement and the rest follow similarly. To prove the
first inequality, assume that O1j < O
2
j . Then, O
1
j < O
2
j = vj (i, O
2
i ) ≤ vj (i, O
1
i ). The second
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inequality is due to the strict monotonicity of pareto payoff function. This implies that O1
is not stable contradicting our assumption. Hence, by contradiction, the first statement is
true.
Lemma 5. Assume |A|− |B| = 1. Pick any i ∈ A and offer oi. Assume there exists a stable
alternating spanning tree generating offer profile O with Oi = oi. Then O is the unique
stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profile with Oi = oi.
Proof. Assume there exists two stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profiles O1
and O2 with O1i = O
2
i = oi. Then EQ (O
1) 6= EQ (O2) or else O1 = O2. Let M◦ (O1)
and M◦ (O2) be the associated near perfect matchings and TM
◦(O1) and TM
◦(O2) be the
associated alternating spanning trees. Clearly TM
◦(O1) 6= TM
◦(O2) or else O1 = O2. With-
out loss of generality assume that i is unmatched in both M◦ (O1) and M◦ (O2). In both
alternating spanning trees, the nodes at even distances from i belong to A and the nodes at
odd distances from i belong to B. Define
AMi = {i
′ ∈ A : O1i′ = O
2
i′} and BMi = {j
′ ∈ B : O1j′ = O
2
j′}
AM1i = {i
′ ∈ A : O1i′ > O
2
i′} and BM
1
i = {j
′ ∈ B : O1j′ > O
2
j′}
AM2i = {i
′ ∈ A : O1i′ < O
2
i′} and BM
2
i = {j
′ ∈ B : O1j′ < O
2
j′}
Since both offer profiles are stable, therefore following the lemma 4:
1. In the alternating tree TM
◦(O1), the parents and children of nodes in AM1i must belong
to BM2i
2. In the alternating tree TM
◦(O1), the parents and children of nodes in BM1i must belong
to AM2i
3. In the alternating tree TM
◦(O2), the parents and children of nodes in AM2i must belong
to BM1i
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4. In the alternating tree TM
◦(O2), the parents and children of nodes in BM2i must belong
to AM1i
Since, the nodes at odd distance in the alternating trees have exactly one child, and all
nodes have exactly one parent, therefore:
1. Using 1, we have |BM2i | ≥ |AM
1
i | and from 4, we have |AM
1
i | ≥ |BM
2
i |+ 1. This gives
a contradiction |BM2i | ≥ |AM
1
i | ≥ |BM
2
i |+ 1 > |BM
2
i |.
2. Using 2, we have |AM2i | ≥ |BM
1
i |+ 1 and from 3, we have |BM
1
i | ≥ |AM
2
i |. This gives
a contradiction |AM2i | ≥ |BM
1
i |+ 1 > |BM
1
i | > |AM
2
i |.
Therefore all the sets AM1i , AM
2
i , BM
1
i , BM
2
i are empty which implies that O
1 = O2.
Lemma 6. Assume |A| − |B| = 1. Pick any i ∈ A and assume that for all oi ≤ ci there
exists a stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profile O with Oi = oi. Pick any
two stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profiles O1 and O2 with O1i ≤ ci and
O2i ≤ ci. If O
1
i < O
2
i , then ∀i
′ ∈ A, O1i′ < O
2
i′ and ∀j
′ ∈ B, O1j′ > O
2
j′.
Proof. Clearly, there is no i′ ∈ A, with O1i′ = O
2
i′, otherwise by lemma 5 o
1
i = o
2
i . Define
AM
′
i = {i
′ ∈ A : O1i′ > O
2
i′} and BM
′
i = {j
′ ∈ B : O1j′ < O
2
j′}
Since both offer profiles are stable, therefore following the lemma 4:
1. In the alternating tree TM
◦(O1), the parents and children of nodes in AM
′
i must belong
to BM
′
i .
2. In the alternating tree TM
◦(O2), the parents and children of nodes in BM
′
i must belong
to AM
′
i .
Since, the nodes at odd distance in the alternating trees have exactly one child, and all
nodes have exactly one parent, therefore using 1, we have |BM
′
i | ≥ |AM
′
i | and from 2, we
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have |AM
′
i | ≥ |BM
′
i |+ 1. This gives a contradiction |BM
′
i | ≥ |AM
′
i | ≥ |BM
′
i |+ 1 > |BM
′
i |.
Therefore, we have AM
′
i and BM
′
i empty which implies that ∀i
′ ∈ A, O1i′ < O
2
i′ and ∀j
′ ∈ B,
O1j′ > O
2
j′.
Lemma 7. Assume |A| − |B| = 1 and assume there exists a stable alternating spanning
tree generating offer profile O. Then ∀i ∈ A, and oi ≤ Oi, there exists a stable alternating
spanning tree generating offer profile O∗ with O∗i = oi.
Proof. First we note that since there exists a near-perfect matching with an alternating
spanning tree in S, therefore by lemma 3, every A′ ⊂ A has at least |A′| neighbors in B and
every B′ ⊆ B has at least |B′|+ 1 neighbors in A.
We will prove the lemma by induction. First for |B| = 1, lets call A = {a1, a2} and
B = {b}. Assume there exists a stable alternating spannign tree generating offer profile
O with the equality subgraph EQ (O), a near perfect matching M◦ (O) and the associated
alternating spanning tree TM
◦(O). Then pick oa1 < Oa1 and set O
′ as O′a1 = oa1 , O
′
b =
vb (a1, oa1) and O
′
a2
= va2 (b, O
′
b). Then clearly, T
M◦(O′) = TM
◦(O). Hence the lemma is true
when |B| = 1.
Now assume that the lemma is true for all 1 ≤ |B| < n. We will show that the lemma is
true for |B| = n. Pick i ∈ A and oi < Oi.
• For all i′ ∈ A set O′i′ = maxP∈PS
i,i′
fPi,i′ (oi).
• For all j ∈ B, set O′j = maxi′∈NbrS(j) vj (i
′, O′i′).
From lemma 2 the equality subgraph EQ (O′) is connected and the offer profile O′ is
stable. Also all nodes j ∈ B have at least one edge in the equality subgraph. Pick a
maximum matching M∗ in EQ (O′) and the alternating forest F ∗ = FM
∗
with respect to
the matching M∗. If F ∗ has exactly one alternating tree that spans all nodes in X, then
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O
∗ = O′ is the desired offer profile and the lemma is true for |B| = n. Otherwise, we proceed
as follows. We will denote:
• AF
∗
= A ∩XF
∗
, BF
∗
= B ∩XF
∗
: the set of nodes in the Hungarian forest that belong
to A and B respectively.
• AF
∗
out = A \ A
F ∗ , BF
∗
out = B \ B
F ∗ : the set of nodes outside the Hungarian forest that
belong to A and B respectively.
We will create a sequence of offer profiles Ot all with Oti = oi and show that the sequences
converges to a stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profile in finite number of
steps. Let I = {i1, i2, ..., im} ⊂ A be the set of unmatched nodes in A. Then the Hungarian
forest F ∗ has m alternating trees each rooted at one of the nodes in I. For node ik we will
call the alternating tree rooted at ik as Tik . Then Tik has one more node in A than in B.
For t=0, set
• Ot = O′.
• EQt = EQ (Ot).
• M t = M∗ and F t = F ∗.
• At = AF
t
, Bt = BF
t
and Atout = A
F t
out, B
t
out = B
F t
out.
• mt = m, I t = {it1, i
t
2, ..., i
t
mt} = I and ∀ik ∈ I
t, T t
it
k
= Tik , i
t = it1, T
t = T t
it
1
.
At any time t, pick it and the alternating tree T t. By lemma 3 there exists an expanding
node i′ ∈ CT
t
with an expanding offer eoi′ = maxj′∈DTt vi′
(
j′, Otj′
)
. Since |BT
t
| < n,
therefore by the assumption for induction, within the subgraph S|XTt , there exists a stable
alternating spanning tree generating offer profile Oi
′
|XTt
with Oi
′
i′ = eoi′ . Consider any two
expanding nodes i′ and i′′, their respective expanding offers eoi′ and eoi′′ and their respective
stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profiles, Oi
′
|XTt
and Oi
′′
|XTt
. By lemma 6, if
eoi′ > O
i′′
i′ , then eoi′′ < O
i′
i′′ . By repeated application of lemma 6, we find that there exists an
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expanding node i∗ with expanding offers eoi∗ and stable alternating spanning tree generating
offer profile, Oi
∗
|XTt
such that for all expanding nodes i′, eoi′ ≤ O
i∗
i′ . For t+ 1, we set:
• For all i′ ∈ XT
t
, set Ot+1i′ = O
i∗
i′ and for i
′ /∈ XT
t
, set Ot+1i′ = O
t
i′.
• EQt+1 = EQ (Ot+1).
• Since, Ot+1
|XTt
is a stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profile within the sub-
graph S|XTt , therefore there is a unique near-perfect matching M
∗
|XTt
⊆ EQ|XTt that
leaves it unmatched. First set M t+1 = M t
|XT
t
out
∪M∗
|XTt
. If there exists an augmenting
path from it with respect to the matching M t+1 within the equality subgraph EQt+1,
then switch the edges within the matching and outside the matching along the aug-
menting path to create a new matching M t+1. Clearly this is a maximum matching in
EQt+1 because there does not exist any other augmenting paths in EQt+1. F t+1 is the
Hungarian forest induced by the matching M t+1 in the equality subgraph EQt+1.
• At+1 = AF
t+1
, Bt+1 = BF
t+1
and At+1out = A
F t+1
out , B
t+1
out = B
F t+1
out .
• If the matching size changed, then set mt+1 = mt − 1, for all k < mt,set it+1k = i
t
k+1,
I t+1 = {it+11 , ..., i
t+1
mt+1
}. If the matching did not change set mt+1 = mt, for all k ≤ mt,set
it+1k = i
t
k, I
t+1 = I t. ∀it+1k ∈ I
t+1, T t+1
it+1
k
is the new alternating tree rooted at it+1k . Set
T t+1 = T t+1
it+1
1
.
We now show that the Hungarian forest satisfies certain properties at all time t.
Proposition 2. The following hold about the Hungarian forest at any time t:
• |BF
t
out| ≥ |A
F t
out|.
• There is no edge between a node in AF
t
and a node in BF
t
out in the equality subgraph
EQ (Ot), i.e.-
(
AF
t
×BF
t
out
)
∩ EQ (Ot) = φ. In other words, all the neighbors of BF
t
out
belong to AF
t
out.
• All edges in the matching M t belong to AF
t
× BF
t
∪AF
t
out × B
F t
out.
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• The number of alternating trees in the Hungarian forest is one more than the number
of unmatched nodes in BF
t
out, i.e.- m
t = |BF
t
out|+ 1.
Proof. Since all nodes in AF
t
out are matched to nodes in B
F t
out, the first claim holds.
Pick a nodei′ ∈ AF
t
and an alternating tree T that contains i′. If there exists an edge
(i′, j′) ∈ EQ (Ot) between node i′ and another node j′ ∈ B, then:
• if the edge is in matchingM t, then the alternating path from the root of the alternating
tree T to i′ includes j′ and hence j′ /∈ BF
t
out.
• if the edge is not in the matching M∗, then the alternating path from the root of the
alternating tree T to i′ can be extended to include j′. Hence, j′ /∈ BF
t
out.
Hence, the second claim follows and the third claim follows from it.
We now prove the fourth claim. The number of unmatched nodes in BF
t
out is |B
F t
out|−|A
F t
out|.
Since all nodes in AF
t
out and B
F t are matched and the number of unmatched nodes in A is
one more than the number of unmatched nodes in B, therefore the number of unmatched
nodes in AF
t
is |BF
t
out| − |A
F t
out|+1. Since each unmatched node in A
F t is the root of a unique
alternating tree, and each alternating tree has a unique root that belong to AF
t
therefore
the number of alternating trees in the Hungarian forest is one more than the number of
unmatched nodes in BF
t
out.
We also observe that the offer profile Ot is stable at any time t as shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. At any time t, the offer profile Ot is stable.
Proof. From 2, we know that the offer profile is stable at t = 0.
Assume that for some t ≥ 0, the offer profile Ot is stable. At iteration t + 1, if the offers
change, then:
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From the construction of Ot+1, and by lemma 6 we know that:
∀i′ ∈ A \ AT
t
, Ot+1i′ = O
t
i′ and ∀j
′ ∈ B \BT
t
, Ot+1j′ = O
t
j′
∀i′ ∈ AT
t
, Ot+1i′ < O
t
i′ and ∀j
′ ∈ BT
t
, Ot+1j′ > O
t
j′
The edges in E can be divided into four mutually exclusive subsets:
• E1 = E ∩
(
AT
t
× BT
t)
• E2 = E ∩
((
A \ AT
t)
×BT
t)
• E3 = E ∩
(
AT
t
×
(
B \BT
t))
• E4 = E ∩
((
A \ AT
t)
×
(
B \BT
t))
From the construction, since Ot+1
|XTt
is a stable alternating spanning tree generating offer
profile within the subgraph S|XTt , therefore,
∀ (i′, j′) ∈ E1, Ot+1i′ ≥ vi′
(
j′, Ot+1j′
)
.
Since Ot was stable therefore
∀ (i′, j′) ∈ E4, Ot+1i′ = O
t
i′ ≥ vi′
(
j′, Otj′
)
= vi′
(
j′, Ot+1j′
)
.
From the construction ofOt+1 and the stability ofOt and since the pareto payoff functions
are strictly decreasing therefore
∀ (i′, j′) ∈ E2, Ot+1i′ = O
t
i′ ≥ vi′
(
j′, Otj′
)
> vi′
(
j′, Ot+1j′
)
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Since for all i′ ∈ At, O
t+1
i′ ≥ eoi′ , therefore
∀ (i, j) ∈ E3, Ot+1i′ ≥ eoi′ ≥ vi′
(
j′, Otj′
)
= vi′
(
j′, Ot+1j′
)
Therefore we see that
∀ (i′, j′) ∈ E,Ot+1i′ ≥ vi′
(
j′, Ot+1j′
)
and hence the offer profile Ot+1 is stable.
By induction at any iteration t ≥ 0, the offer profile Ot is stable.
We also notice the following about the structural properties of the Hungarian forest and
the offer profile at any time t in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. At any time t ≥ 0:
1. For all t′ > t and all i′ ∈ A, Ot
′
i′ ≤ O
t
i′ and for all j
′ ∈ B, Ot
′
j′ ≥ O
t
j′.
2. For all unmatched nodes j′ ∈ B, Otj′ = O
0
j′.
3. If at any time t a node j ∈ B \BT
t
has Otj > O
t
j, then j has an alternating path for the
matching M t in EQt from some j′ ∈ B such that Otj′ = O
0
j′.
4. If at any time t a node j ∈ Bt has Otj > O
0
j , then j has a path in EQ
t to some j′ ∈ B
such that Otj′ = O
0
j′.
Proof. Since at any time t, for any expanding node i′ ∈ CT
t
, the expanding offer eoi′ < O
t
i′,
therefore by lemma 6 for all i′ ∈ AT
t
, Oti′ < O
t−1
i′ and for all i
′ ∈ A \ AT
t
, Oti′ = O
t−1
i′ . Also,
for all j′ ∈ BT
t
, Otj′ > O
t−1
j′ and for all j
′ ∈ B \BT
t
, Otj′ = O
t−1
j′ . Hence the first claim holds.
Clearly, if the node j′ ∈ B is unmatched, it must not have been any alternating tree until
time t. Hence Otj′ = O
0
j′.
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We now prove the third claim. first we note that B \BT
t
=
(
Bt \BT
t)
∪ (B \Bt).
If j ∈ Bt \ BT
t
, i.e.- j is in the Hungarian forest but not in the alternating tree T t at time
t, then Otj = O
0
j . To see this, assume that j ∈ T
t
it
k
for some 1 < k < mt. Then all nodes
i′ ∈ A
T t
it
k have Oti′ = O
0
i′ and therefore by stability of O
0 and claim 1, Otj = O
0
j .
If a node j ∈ B \ Bt, i.e.- j is not in the hungarian forest, then either Otj = O
0
j or at some
time t′ < t it was in the alternating tree T t
′
. Pick t◦ to the be maximum of such times
t′. Since, j′ was never in the hungarian forest after t◦, therefore at t◦ + 1, the alternating
tree T t
◦
connected to a joining node j′ with an alternating path to an unmatched node j◦.
From claim 2, Ot
◦
j◦ = O
0
j◦. At that time t
◦ + 1, an alternating path was created from j◦ to j.
Clearly, j◦ was never in the hungarian forest until t, otherwise j would be in the hungarian
forest after time t◦ too. Therefore, Otj◦ = O
t◦
j◦ = O
0
j◦ and j has an alternating path from j
◦
for which Otj◦ = O
0
j◦. Hence claim 3 holds.
We will prove the fourth claim by induction. Clearly the claim holds for t = 0. Assume
the claim holds for some t ≥ 0. At time t + 1, the alternating tree connects to one of the
joining nodes j ∈ B \ BT
t
. By claim 3 j has a path to some j′ with Ot+1j′ = O
t
j′ = O
0
j′ and
hence all nodes in the alternating tree have a path to a nodes j′ for which Ot+1j′ = O
0
j′. Hence
by induction the claim holds.
We now observe cetain properties of the equality subgraph outside the Hungarian forest
at all times in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. At any time t ≥ 0, the following hold:
1. If there is more than one alternating tree in the Hungarian forest, then for all j ∈ B,
such that there is an alternating path Pj,i ⊆ EQ
t from j to i, for all nodes k′ ∈ XPj,i,
Otk′ = O
0
k′.
2. Assume that at time t+ 1 the alternating tree T t connects to a joining node j ∈ DT
t
=
NbrE
(
AT
t)
\ BT
t
such that there is an alternating path Pj,i ⊆ EQ
t from j to i,. Let
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J ⊂ DT
t
be the set of joining nodes that the tree T t connects to at time t + 1. Then
each node in DT
t
can be reached on alternating paths from nodes in J in EQt.
3. If i belongs to the alternating tree T t then DT
t
= φ.
4. If there is more than one alternating tree in the Hungarian forest, the the node i does
not belong to the Hungarian forest.
Proof. Clearly, the first claim hold at t = 0.
For the fourth claim at t = 0, assume that there is more than one alternating tree in the
Hungarian forest and i belongs to the Hungarian forest. Assume without loss of generality
that i belongs to an alternating tree T . Then AT ⊂ A has at least |AT | neighbors in S. Since
T has |AT | − 1 nodes in BT , therefore at least one of these neighbors is outside T . Pick one
such neighbor j′ ∈ B \BT . By lemma 2, since the tree T contains i, therefore, T contains at
least one neighbor i′ of j′ in the equality subgraph EQ (O0). Then since (i′, j′) ∈ EQ (O0)
and i′ ∈ AT , therefore by proposition 2, j′ ∈ BT . This contradicts our assumption that j′ is
outside the alternating tree. Hence by contradiction, the fourth claim holds at t = 0.
Assume the first and the fourth claims hold for some t ≥ 0. Then at t+1 if for any node
k′ ∈ XP , Ot+1k′ 6= O
t
k′ = O
0
k′, then k
′ must be in the alternating tree BT
t
at t. This means
that i was in the alternating tree at t which is a contradiction. Hence, the first claim is
satisfied at t + 1. Therefore by induction claim 1 holds true.
At t + 1, assume that the alternating tree T t connects to a joining node j that has an
alternating path to i. Let J ⊂ DT
t
be the set of joining nodes that the tree T t connects
to at time t + 1. Pick any j′ ∈ NbrE
(
AT
t)
\ BT
t
and assume that j′ is not reachable from
an alternating path from any node in J in EQt. Clearly, then j′ is not reachable from an
alternating path from any node in J in EQt+1. Pick i′ ∈ AT
t
such that (i′, j′) ∈ E. By
proposition 4, j′ is reachable by an alternating path Pj◦,j′ from some j
◦ with Otj◦ = O
0
j◦ in
both EQt EQt+1. By stability of Ot and Ot+1, and claim 1 of proposition 4, all neighbors of
j◦ in EQ0 are also neighbors of j in EQt and EQt+1. Pick a neighbor i◦ of j◦ in EQ0. From
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the assumption, no node in XPj◦,j′ ∪ {i◦} belongs to the alternating tree T t and no node in
XPj◦,j′ ∪ {i◦} is reachable by an alternating path from any node in J . Consider the paths
Pi,i′ ⊂ EQ
t+1,Pj′,j◦ ⊂ EQ
t+1 and the path Pi,i◦ = Pi,i′ ∪ {i
′, j′}∪Pj′,j◦ ∪ {j
◦, i◦} from i to i◦.
The offer induced on i◦ by the path Pi,i◦ for the offer oi on i is
f
Pi,i◦
i,i◦ (oi)
= vi◦
(
j◦, f
Pj′,j◦
j′,j◦
(
vj′
(
i′, f
Pi,i′
i,i′ (oi)
)))
> vi◦
(
j◦, f
Pj′,j◦
j′,j◦
(
Ot+1j′
))
since by stability of Ot+1, Ot+1j′ > vj′
(
i′, Ot+1i′
)
= vj′
(
f
Pi,i′
i,i′ (oi)
)
= vi◦
(
j◦, Ot+1j◦
)
= Ot+1i◦
= O0i◦
This is a contradiction because by the definition of O0, O0i◦ is the maximum path induced
offer on i◦ for the offer oi on i. Hence by contradiction, the second claim holds.
We now prove the third claim. Assume that at time t i belongs to the alternating tree
T t and DT
t
6= φ. Pick j′ ∈ DT
t
. By proposition 4, j′ is reachable by an alternating path
Pj◦,j′ from some j
◦ with Otj◦ = O
0
j◦ in EQ
t. By stability of Ot, and claim 1 of proposition 4,
all neighbors of j◦ in EQ0 are also neighbors of j in EQt. Pick a neighbor i◦ of j◦ in EQ0.
From the assumption, no node in XPj◦,j′ ∪ {i◦} belongs to the alternating tree T t. Consider
the paths Pi,i′ ⊂ EQ
t,Pj′,j◦ ⊂ EQ
t and the path Pi,i◦ = Pi,i′ ∪ {i
′, j′} ∪ Pj′,j◦ ∪ {j
◦, i◦} from
i to i◦. The offer induced on i◦ by the path Pi,i◦ for the offer oi on i is
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f
Pi,i◦
i,i◦ (oi)
= vi◦
(
j◦, f
Pj′,j◦
j′,j◦
(
vj′
(
f
Pi,i′
i,i′ (oi)
)))
> vi◦
(
j◦, f
Pj′,j◦
j′,j◦
(
Otj′
))
since by stability of Ot, Otj′ > vj′
(
i′, Oti′
)
= vj′
(
f
Pi,i′
i,i′ (oi)
)
= vi◦
(
j◦, Otj◦
)
= Oti◦
= O0i◦
This is a contradiction because by the definition of O0, O0i◦ is the maximum path induced
offer on i◦ for the offer oi on i. Hence by contradiction, either i does not belong to the
alternating tree T t or DT
t
= φ. This proves claim 3.
The fourth claim follows from the first claim as follows. Assume i does not belong to the
Hungarian forest until time t− 1. Assume i belongs to the Hungarian forest at time t which
implies that at time t, T t−1 connected to a node j with an alternating path to i and hence
i belongs to the alternating tree T t. Since there are more than one alternating trees in the
Hungarian forest, then |AT
t
| < |A|, and therefore there is at least one joining node j′ ∈ DT
t
that T t can connect to by some expanding node i′ ∈ AT
t
. This contradicts claim 3 that
DT
t
= φ. Hence i does not belong to the Hungarian forest at time t. By induction, claim 4
holds.
Proposition 6. At any time t, if the Hungarian forest has only one alternating tree T t, and
this alternating tree contains i, then this alternating tree spans all nodes in X.
Proof. Since the Hungarian forest has only one alternating tree T t and it contains i, then by
proposition 5, DT
t
= φ. If AT
t
6= A then |NbrE
(
AT
t)
| = |BT
t
|+ |DT
t
| = |AT
t
|−1+ |DT
t
| =
|AT
t
| − 1 < |AT
t
| which contradicts lemma 3. Therefore AT
t
= A and |BT
t
| = |AT
t
| − 1 =
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|A| − 1 = |B|. Therefore BT
t
= B. Therefore T t spans all nodes in X.
Proposition 7. If at some time t, mt > 1, then at some finite time t◦, the matching increases
by 1.
Proof. The root of the alternating tree T t is it1. At each time t
′ > t, until it1 is matched, the
alternating tree T t
′−1 has the root it
′−1
1 = i
t
1 and one of the following happens:
1. T t
′−1 connects to a joining node j ∈ DT
t′−1
such that j has an alternating path to an
unmatched node j◦.
2. T t
′−1 connects to a joining node j ∈ DT
t′−1
such that j has an alternating path to i.
3. T t
′−1 connects to joining nodes J ⊆ DT
t′−1
such that no nodes in J have an alternating
path to either an unmatched node or to i.
In the third case, BT
t′−1
⊂ BT
t′
. Thus the alternating tree rooted at it1 increases. Since,
B is finite, therefore the third case happens only finitely many times. Therefore, at some
finite time t◦, either of the first two cases happen. If the first case happens at t◦, then there is
an augmenting path from it1 to some unmatched node j
◦. Thus, by construction of matching
M t
◦
at time t◦, it1 is matched in M
t◦ and the matching increases by 1. If the second case
happens at time t◦, then it will contradict proposition 5 unless the first case happens along
with the second case at time t◦. Hence at time t◦, it1 is matched in M
t◦ and the matching
increases by 1.
Proposition 8. At some finite time t∗, the offer profile Ot
∗
is a stable alternating spanning
tree generating offer profile.
Proof. By repeated application of proposition 7, we see that at some finite t◦, there is only
one alternating tree in the Hungarian forest. At any time t′ > t◦, unless T t
′−1 spans all nodes
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in X, the alternating tree T t
′−1 has the root it
◦
1 = i
t′−1
1 and one of the following happens:
1. T t
′−1 connects to a joining node j ∈ DT
t′−1
such that j has an alternating path to i.
2. T t
′−1 connects to joining nodes J ⊆ DT
t′−1
such that no nodes in J have an alternating
path to i.
In the second case, BT
t′−1
⊂ BT
t′
. Thus the alternating tree rooted at it
◦
1 increases. Since,
B is finite, therefore the second case happens only finitely many times. Therefore, at some
finite time t∗, the first case happens. By proposition 6 at time t∗, the alternating tree T t
∗
spans all nodes in X. Also by proposition 3, the offer profie Ot
∗
is stable. Therefore, at
some finite time t∗, the offer profile Ot
∗
is a stable alternating spanning tree generating offer
profile.
By proposition 8, in finite time the sequence Ot converges to a stable alternating spanning
tree generating offer profile O∗ for |B| = n. By induction, the lemma holds. This completes
the proof of the lemma.
We now present the main result of this section that uses the results we developed.
Theorem 1. Assume |A| − |B| = 1. Assume there exists a stable alternating spanning tree
generating offer profile O with Oj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ B. Pick i, i
′ ∈ A and j ∈ B and define the
functions:
• fSi,i′ : (− inf, Oi]→ (− inf, Oi′] with f
S
i,i′ (x) = O
′
i′, such that O
′ is the stable alternating
spanning tree generating offer profile with O′i = x and O
′
j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ B.
• fSi′,i : (− inf, Oi′]→ (− inf, Oi] with f
S
i′,i (x) = O
′
i, such that O
′ is the stable alternating
spanning tree generating offer profile with O′i = x and O
′
j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ B.
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• fSi,j : (− inf, Oi] → [Oj, inf) with f
S
i,j (x) = O
′
j, such that O
′ is the stable alternating
spanning tree generating offer profile with O′i = x and O
′
j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ B.
The functions fSi,i′ and f
S
i′,i are inverse of each other and are continuous and strictly
increasing for each pair i, i′ ∈ A. The function fSi,j is continuous and strictly decreasing for
each pair i ∈ A, j ∈ B.
Proof. From lemmas 7 and 5, we know that the functions fSi,i′ and f
S
i′,i are well defined and
are inverse of each other. Also from lemma 6, we know the functions fSi,i′ and f
S
i′,i are strictly
increasing within the intervals (− inf, Oi) and (− inf, Oi′) respectively.
Now consider an open interval (x, y) ⊆ (− inf, Oi) with y ≤ Oi and set x
′ = fSi,i′ (x)
and y′ = fSi,i′ (y). Then since f
S
i,i′ and f
S
i′,i are strictly increasing, ∀z ∈ (x, y), f
S
i,i′ (z) =(
fi′,i
)−1
(z) ∈ (x′, y′) and ∀z′ ∈ (x′, y′), fSi′,i (z
′) =
(
fSi,i′
)−1
(z′) ∈ (x, y). Since, x, y were arbi-
trarily picked, therefore for all open intervals in (− inf, Oi], the inverse images f
−1
i′,i ((x, y)) =
fSi,i′ ((x, y)) are open intervals. Therefore, by definition, f
S
i′,i is continuous. By similar rea-
soning, fSi,i′ is continuous.
Since for any x ∈ (− inf, Oi), the offer profile O
′ is stable alternating spanning tree gen-
erating offer profile, therefore fSi,j (x) = maxi′∈Nbr(j) vj (i
′, O′i′) = maxi′∈Nbr() vj
(
i′, fSi,i′ (x)
)
.
Since the functions v are continuous and strictly decreasing and fSi,i′ is continuous and strictly
increasing and maximum of continous strictly decreasing functions is continuous and strictly
decreasing, therefore fSi,j (x) is continuous and strictly decreasing in x.
4 Algorithm
In this section, we present an algorithm to find a stable and feasible offer profile for a bipartite
network S. Existence of a stable and feasible offer profile proves the existence of a stable
weighted matching in S. The algorithm is described as follows.
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4.1 Initialization
We first define an initial offer profile O0 and the initial matching as follows.
For t=0, set
1. ∀j ∈ B, set O0j = 0 and ∀i ∈ A, set O
0
i = maxj∈Nbr(i) vi (j, 0).
2. Set EQ0 = EQ (O0).
3. Set M0 = M∗ (EQ0) some maximum matching in EQ0.
4. if there is an alternating path from an unmatched node i ∈ A with Oi > 0 to a matched
node i◦ ∈ A with O◦i = 0, then switch the alternating edges from within the matching
M0 to outside the matching M0 and vice-versa along the alternating path from i to i◦.
This leaves the matching size unchanged. Repeat this process until no such alternating
paths are present in EQ0.
5. Set I0 = {i01, i
0
2, ..., i
0
m0
} as the set of unmatched nodes in A with positive offers. Set
m0 = |I0|, and ∀i0k ∈ I
0, setT 0
i0
k
= Ti0
k
as the alterating tree induced by the matching M0
rooted at i0k. Set T
0 = T 0
it
1
as the alternating tree under consideration.
4.2 Iteration
We iteratively change the offer profile to create a sequence of offer profiles. At each time
t ≥ 0, we compute the new offer profile Ot+1 as follows.
While I t 6= φ, pick T t.
1. ∀i ∈ CT
t
, set the expanding offer
eoi = max{max
j∈DTt
vi
(
j, Otj
)
, 0}
and select ic ∈ CT
t
: f
S
|XT
t
ic,i (eoic) ≥ eoi, ∀i ∈ C
T t
Theorem 1 implies that such a node exists in CT
t
.
31
2. ∀i ∈ AT t ∪ B
T t set Ot+1i = f
S
|XT
t
ic,i (eoic) and
∀i /∈ AT t ∪ BT t set O
t+1
i = O
t
i.
3. Set EQt+1 = EQ (Ot+1).
4. Since, Ot+1
|XTt
is a stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profile within the sub-
graph S|XTt , therefore there is a unique near-perfect matching M
∗
|XTt
⊆ EQt+1
|XTt
that
leaves it1 unmatched. First set M
t+1 = M t
|XT
t
out
∪M∗
|XTt
. If there exists an augmenting
path from it with respect to the matching M t+1 within the equality subgraph EQt+1,
then switch the edges within the matching and outside the matching along the aug-
menting path to create a new matching M t+1. This increases the size of the matchign
by 1. If there is no augmenting path but there is an alternating path from it1 to a
matched node i◦ ∈ A with Ot+1i◦ = 0, then switch the alternating edges from within the
matching M t+1 and outside the matching M t+1 along the alternating path from it1 to
i◦. This leaves the matching size unchanged but it1 is now matched. Clearly this is a
maximum matching in EQt+1 because there does not exist any other augmenting paths
in EQt+1.
5. If it1 is matched in M
t+1, or Ot+1
it
1
= 0 then set mt+1 = mt − 1, for all k < mt,set
it+1k = i
t
k+1, I
t+1 = {it+11 , ..., i
t+1
mt+1
}. Otherwise set mt+1 = mt, for all k ≤ mt,set
it+1k = i
t
k, I
t+1 = I t. ∀it+1k ∈ I
t+1, T t+1
it+1
k
is the new alternating tree rooted at it+1k . Set
T t+1 = T t+1
it+1
1
.
4.3 Convergence
We now show that the algorithm converges in finitely many iterations and the offer profile
at the point of convergence is feasible and stable. We need to show that for some finite t∗,
the maximum matching M t
∗
has all nodes with positive offers are matched. We also need
to show that Ot
∗
is stable.
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Proposition 9. At any iteration t ≥ 0, the offer profile Ot is stable.
Proof. At t = 0 we know the offer profile is stable because by construction ∀i ∈ A, set
O0i = maxj∈Nbr(i) vi
(
j, O0j
)
. Assume that for some t ≥ 0, the offer profile Ot is stable. If at
iteration t+1, the offers do not change, then offer profile Ot+1 is stable. If at iteration t+1,
the offers change, then:
From the construction of Ot+1, and by theorem 1 we know that:
∀i′ ∈ A \ AT
t
, Ot+1i′ = O
t
i′ and ∀j
′ ∈ B \BT
t
, Ot+1j′ = O
t
j′
∀i′ ∈ AT
t
, Ot+1i′ < O
t
i′ and ∀j
′ ∈ BT
t
, Ot+1j′ > O
t
j′
The edges in E can be divided into four mutually exclusive subsets:
• E1 = E ∩
(
AT
t
× BT
t)
• E2 = E ∩
((
A \ AT
t)
×BT
t)
• E3 = E ∩
(
AT
t
×
(
B \BT
t))
• E4 = E ∩
((
A \ AT
t)
×
(
B \BT
t))
From the construction, since Ot+1
|XTt
is a stable alternating spanning tree generating offer
profile within the subgraph S|XTt , therefore,
∀ (i′, j′) ∈ E1, Ot+1i′ ≥ vi′
(
j′, Ot+1j′
)
.
Since Ot was stable therefore
∀ (i′, j′) ∈ E4, Ot+1i′ = O
t
i′ ≥ vi′
(
j′, Otj′
)
= vi′
(
j′, Ot+1j′
)
.
From the construction ofOt+1 and the stability ofOt and since the pareto payoff functions
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are strictly decreasing therefore
∀ (i′, j′) ∈ E2, Ot+1i′ = O
t
i′ ≥ vi′
(
j′, Otj′
)
> vi′
(
j′, Ot+1j′
)
Since for all i′ ∈ At, O
t+1
i′ ≥ eoi′ , therefore
∀ (i, j) ∈ E3, Ot+1i′ ≥ eoi′ ≥ vi′
(
j′, Otj′
)
= vi′
(
j′, Ot+1j′
)
Therefore we see that
∀ (i′, j′) ∈ E,Ot+1i′ ≥ vi′
(
j′, Ot+1j′
)
and hence the offer profile Ot+1 is stable.
By induction at any iteration t ≥ 0, the offer profile Ot is stable.
Proposition 10. At any iteration t ≥ 0, if there exists j ∈ B with Otj > 0, then j is matched
in M t.
Proof. At t = 0, since all nodes in B have offers 0, this holds true. Assume that at some
iteration t ≥ 0, if there exists j ∈ B with Otj > 0, then j is matched in M
t. If the offer
profile does not change at time t + 1, then nothing changes and the proposition holds at
t+ 1. Otherwise, at time t+ 1, one of the following happens:
1. T t connects to a joining node j ∈ DT
t
such that j has an alternating path to an
unmatched node j◦.
2. T t connects to a joining node j ∈ DT
t
such that j has an alternating path to a matched
node i◦ ∈ A \ AT
t
with Ot+1i◦ = 0.
3. Ot+1i = 0 for some i ∈ A
T t .
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4. T t connects to joining nodes J ⊆ DT
t
but the above cases do not happen.
At t + 1, all nodes in BT
t
are matched to the nodes in AT
t
by the selected near-perfect
matching M∗
|XTt
at time t+ 1. From the assumption at time t, we know that if there exists
j ∈ B with Otj > 0, then j is matched in M
t. Therefore, any node j ∈ B \BT
t
with Otj > 0
is matched to some node in A \ AT
t
in M t since EQt ∩
(
A \ AT
t
×B \BT
t)
= φ. For all
nodes j ∈ B \BT
t
, we know that Ot+1j = O
t
j.
In the fourth case M t+1 = M∗
|XTt
∪M t
|X\XTt
and hence all nodes in B that were matched
at time t are matched at time t + 1. In the first case, before exchanging any edges, we see
that as in the third case, all nodes in B that were matched at time t are matched at time
t + 1. By exchanging the edges within the matching M t+1 with edges outside the matching
in the augmenting path, the nodes in the augmenting path still stay matched and it does not
change matching outside the augmenting path, so all nodes in B that were matched at time
t are matched at time t+1. For the second and third case, by the same argument, all nodes
in B that were matched at time t are matched at time t + 1. Thus we see that all nodes in
B that were matched in M t are matched in M t+1. Therefore any node j ∈ B with Otj > 0
that was matched in M t is matched in M t+1. Also all nodes j ∈ B for which Ot+1j > O
t
j ≥ 0
belong to BT
t
and hence are matched in M t+1. Therefore any node j ∈ B with Ot+1j > 0 is
matched in M t+1. Thus by induction, the proposition holds.
Theorem 2. There exists a finite time t∗ for which Ot
∗
is feasible and stable.
Proof. We will first show that at some finite time t∗, mt
∗
= 0, i.e.- all nodes in A with positive
offers are matched. Then we will show that at that time t∗, Ot
∗
is feasible and stable.
For any t, the root of the alternating tree T t is it1. At each time t
′ > t, until it1 is matched,
the alternating tree T t
′
has the root it
′
1 = i
t
1 and one of the following happens:
1. T t
′−1 connects to a joining node j ∈ DT
t′−1
such that j has an alternating path to an
unmatched node j◦ or a matched node i◦ ∈ A \ AT
t′−1
with Ot
′
i◦ = 0.
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2. Ot
′
i = 0 for some i ∈ A
T t
′−1
.
3. T t
′−1 connects to joining nodes J ⊆ DT
t′−1
but the above two cases do not happen.
In the third case, BT
t′−1
⊂ BT
t′
. Thus the alternating tree rooted at it1 increases. Since,
B is finite, therefore the third case happens only finitely many times. Therefore, at some
finite time t◦, either of the first two cases happen. If the first case happes at t◦, then there
is an augmenting path from it1 to j
◦ or there is an alternating path from it1 to some i
◦ with
Ot
◦
i◦ = 0. Thus, by construction of matching M
t◦ at time t◦, it1 is matched in M
t◦ and
mt
◦
= mt
◦−1. If the second case happes at t◦, then there is an alternating path from it1 to
some i with Ot
◦
i = 0. Thus, by construction of matching M
t◦ at time t◦, it1 is matched in
M t
◦
and mt
◦
= mt
◦−1. Hence at time t◦, it1 is matched in M
t◦ and mt
◦
= mt
◦−1.
Sincem0 is finite, andmt decreases by 1 in finitely many iterations when mt > 0, therefore
at some finite time t∗, mt
∗
= 0.
We now show that at t∗, Ot
∗
is feasible and stable. From proposition 9, it follows that Ot
∗
is stable. Also from proposition 10 we see that all nodes j ∈ B with Ot
∗
j > 0 are matched in
M t
∗
. Since mt
∗
= 0, therefore all nodes i ∈ A with Ot
∗
i > 0 are matched in M
t∗ . Consider
the matching M t
∗
and a split sM
t∗
as follows:
∀(i, j) ∈M t
∗
, set sM
t∗
(i) = u−1i
(
j, Ot
∗
i
)
,
sM
t∗
(j) = u−1j
(
i, Ot
∗
j
)
,
∀ unmatched i ∈ A, sM
t∗
(i) = 0.
∀ unmatched i ∈ A, sM
t∗
(i) = 0.
The above is a well defined split because for all(i, j) ∈M t
∗
,
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sM
t∗
(i) + sM
t∗
(j)
= u−1i
(
j, Ot
∗
i
)
+ sM
t∗
(j)
= u−1i
(
j, vi
(
j, Ot
∗
j
))
+ sM
t∗
(j)
= u−1i
(
j, vi
(
j, uj
(
i, sM
t∗
(j)
)))
+ sM
t∗
(j)
= u−1i
(
j, ui
(
j, w (i, j)− sM
t∗
(j)
))
+ sM
t∗
(j)
= w (i, j)− sM
t∗
(j) + sM
t∗
(j)
= w (i, j) .
Hence, we have a weighted matching
(
M t
∗
, sM
t∗
)
with payoff profile U
(
M t
∗
, sM
t∗
)
=
O
t∗ . Therefore Ot
∗
is a feasible offer profile.
From theorem 2, we have proved the existence of a feasible and stable offer profile and
have also found a stable weighted matching
(
M t
∗
, sM
t∗
)
in the bipartite network S.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we extended the stable matching problem in bipartite networks to the gen-
eral scenario where nodes derive value from the part of the split as well as the node they
are matched to. This problem appears in real life scenarios and has applications in several
problems such as marriage and matching theories, group selection, bargaining in networks
and exchanges in networks. We studied a very general case when the value is continuous
and strictly increasing in the part of the split and proved the existence of a stable weighted
matching. The key ingredient to the proof is the existence of strictly monotonic and con-
tinuous stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profiles that helps us exend the
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Hungarian method to the generalized case. The method of computing a stable alternating
spanning tree generating offer profile is not very efficient. However, with additional structure
on the value functions and correlations between value functions, more efficient methods can
be employed and will be an interesting line of future work.
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